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Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony
in the Guilt Phase of Bifurcated Trials:
What's Left After the Reforms of the
Diminished Capacity Defense?
If people once believed they knew a lunatic when they saw one,
that sense of confidence has long disappeared.' Recently, courts have
relied heavily on mental health experts whenever a question arises about
a defendant's mental health. Use of psychiatric testimony to establish
that a defendant's capacity to form the criminal intent of a charged
offense was diminished by his mental condition has been severely
criticized by laypersons and professionals.2
The total number of criminal offenders who are successful in using
one of the three available psychiatric defenses amount to less than
one percent of all felony convictions.3 Successful use of the dimin-
ished capacity defense in a few highly publicized cases,' however,
prompted the California Legislature to enact measures designed to
restrict the use of mental health evidence in the guilt phase of a bifur-
cated trial. I
These legislative reforms have resulted in confusion about the ad-
missibility of psychiatric testimony6 and the extent to which the
diminished capacity defense is available.7 Additionally, the legislation
may face challenge as a violation of a defendant's constitutional right
to due process of law.8 This author will determine the scope of ad-
1. G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING OF THE CRMNAL LAw 839 (1978).
2. Hearings on the Role of Psychiatry in Determining Criminal Responsibility 10-13, JOINT
COMMIrTEE FOR THE REVISiON OF THE PENAL CODE (April 11, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Role
of Psychiatry].
3. Id. at 59-60. The three psychiatric defenses are incompetency to stand trial, dimin-
ished capacity, and not guilty by reason of insanity. Id.
4. See, e.g., People v. White, 117 Cal. App. 3d 270, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981) (defen-
dant shot and killed San Francisco Mayor George Moscone and Supervisor Harvey Milk).
5. See infra notes 95-164 and accompanying text; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §1026. In
California, when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and also enters another
plea, he is tried first on the latter plea. Should the defendant be found guilty in the initial
phase, the issue of insanity then is tried either before the same jury or a new one. Id.
6. See infra notes 99-106 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. See Comment, The Relevance of Innocence: Proposition 8 and the Diminished Capacity
Defense, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1197, 1202 (1983). See also People v. Norman McCowan, 3 Crim.
12853 3rd District Court of Appeal, Appellant Brief at 11-12.
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missible psychiatric testimony in the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial
and assess whether the diminished capacity defense is still available.
To understand the legislative changes in the diminished capacity
defense, this comment first will provide an overview of the defense
as it has been developed judicially. Criticisms of the judicial treat-
ment will then be examined. Next, ambiguous statutory restrictions
on the judicially created defense will be interpreted through use of
extrinsic aids to determine the present state of diminished capacity
in California. Finally, the author will suggest legislation to eliminate
the uncertainty created by recent statutory reforms of the diminished
capacity defense. The following section will explain briefly the dif-
ferent approaches within the diminished capacity defense and the results
of successful use of the defense.
DIMINISHED CAPACITY: AN OVERVIEW
Crimes generally are composed of at least two elements, the volun-
tary act (actus reus) proscribed by law and the culpable state of mind
(mens rea).' Most crimes require the concurrence of act and intent.'0
Therefore, defendants who can show that they did not form the re-
quisite intent cannot be convicted of the charged crime.
Legal insanity is an all-or-nothing defense." A defendant either is
sane and totally responsible, or insane, and therefore, not at all
responsible." A finding of insanity is not ordinarily a determination
that the defendant was not able to form the requisite mental state.
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity does not reflect a find-
ing of an inability to intend; rather, it is a determination that under
the applicable standard or test, the defendant should be excused from
criminal responsibility for his act.'
Unlike the insanity defense, diminished capacity is a partial defense
that does not completely exonerate a defendant, but merely reduces
the degree or nature of the crime charged."' For example, even if
a defendant can show that, due to diminished capacity, he never
formed the malice aforethought required for a second degree murder
conviction, he still may be convicted of the lesser included offense
9. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 743 (1969).
10. CAL. PENAL CODE §20.
I1. Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14 STAN. L. REv. 59, 62 (1961).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., State v. Hebard, 184 N.W.2d 156, 163 (Wis. 1971); see also, Diamond, supra
note 11, at 62.
14. Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two
Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 CoIrm. L. REv. 827, 828 (1977).
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of manslaughter.II Two forms of the diminished capacity defense have
been developed to reduce the degree of the crime charged, the strict
mens rea approach and the partial responsibility approach.' 6 These
two approaches must be distinguished to facilitate comprehension of
the judicial expansion of the diminished capacity defense and statutory
reforms.
A. Strict Mens Rea Approach
In the strict mens rea approach, the jury is asked to consider whether
a presumably sane defendant's mental abnormality at the time of the
crime prevented him from forming the requisite mental state for the
eharged offense. If the jury finds that the required mens rea was not
formed, the defendant cannot be convicted of the charged offense,
but only may be convicted of a lesser included offense.' 7 For exam-
ple, a mentally ill defendant charged with first degree murder who
can show that he was unable to premeditate or deliberate may reduce
a conviction to second degree murder.' 8 Because the strict mens rea
approach seeks to discover whether a defendant actually formed the
required mental state, only mental health testimony which is probative
of its existence or absence is relevant evidence.' 9 For example,
psychiatric testimony that the defendant suffers from a mental illness
which causes him to believe he owns things that he does not in fact
own, would be relevant in some circumstances to show that the defen-
dant did not form the intent to steal. The focus, then, of the strict
mens rea approach is on whether the requisite mental state was formed
by the accused.20 In contrast, a second, and more liberal, approach
used by courts is the diminished responsibility approach.
B. Diminished Responsibility Approach
Under the diminished responsibility approach, any mental abnor-
mality short of insanity may be taken into account by the jury in
15. Id. at 829.
16. See id.; see also Morse & Cohen, Diminishing Diminished Capacity in California,
CALIFORNIA LAWYER at 24 (June 1982). This article was cited in People v. Whitsett, 149 Cal.
App. 3d 213, 220-21, 196 Cal. Rptr. 647, 651 (1983) as evidence of legislative intent.
17. Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Condundrum, app. to Hearing on
the Defense of Diminished Capacity and Insanity, JOINT COMMImE FOR THE REVISION OF THE
PENAL CODE at 364 (1979).
18. See, e.g., People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 858, 423 P.2d 777, 782, 56 Cal. Rptr.
625, 630 (1967).
19. See Arenella, supra note 14, at 839.
20. Id. at 829.
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assessing a defendant's blameworthiness. 2' If the jury believes that
because of defendant's mental illness, he is less culpable than a nor-
mal defendant, he may be subject to punishment for a lesser offense
than the one charged.22 Thus, the jury is asked to consider the moral
question of whether the defendant, due to his mental abnormality,
is less responsible for his actions even though his conduct satisfied
the formal elements of the crime charged. Because the presence of
mental abnormality rather than the absence of the requisite mens rea
is at issue under a diminished responsibility theory, any evidence show-
ing that the defendant was less mentally capable than a normal per-
son would be admissible.23
Neither California nor any other American jurisdiction has adopted
the diminished responsibility approach explicitly. 2 The diminished
capacity defense in California, however, as developed by the State
Supreme Court, has extended beyond the narrow strict mens rea ap-
proach until the defense began to resemble diminished responsibility.
Expansion of the diminished capacity defense beyond the scope of
the strict mens rea approach can be observed by examining a few
important California Supreme Court cases. 25 To understand what the
legislature seeks to accomplish by its reform of the diminished capacity
defense, the judicial development of the defense must be explored.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY
DEFENSE IN CALIFORNIA
The diminished capacity defense was developed to mitigate what
the courts perceived to be rather harsh requirements of the insanity
defense. 26 The desire to create a middle ground of criminal respon-
sibility was said to have been the primary motivating factor in the
use of diminished capacity by the California Supreme Court. 27 Over
the thirty year history of the defense, the court expanded the defense
beyond the strict mens rea approach. This expansion will be
demonstrated by looking at a series of California Supreme Court opin-
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 829-30.
24. Id. at 830.
25. See infra notes 28-79 and accompanying text.
26. See People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 490-92, 386 P.2d 677, 681-82, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 81-82 (1963); People v. Goedecke, 65 Cal. 2d 850, 855, 423 P.2d 777, 780, 56 Cal.
Rptr. 625, 628 (1967).
27. Comment, A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity, 18 UCLA L. REv. 561,
566-67 (1971).
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ions beginning with People v. Wells,2" the first case to develop the
diminished capacity defense.
A. Development of Strict Mens Rea
The defendant in Wells was an inmate serving a life term and was
charged with assaulting a prison guard, a crime which required a show-
ing of malice aforethought as one of its elements.29 The defendant
contended that he lacked malice aforethought because he was react-
ing to an honest but unreasonable fear of bodily harm.3" At trial,
the defendant attempted to introduce medical testimony to establish
that he was suffering from an abnormal physical and mental condi-
tion which caused him to fear for his personal safety. This fear would
arise from even slight external stimuli.' The California Supreme Court
held that the exclusion of the proffered evidence was improper because
the evidence was patently relevant to showing that the essential ele-
ment, malice aforethought, was missing. 2 The court formulated a
general rule that competent evidence, other than proof of sanity or
insanity, was admissible if it tended to show that a then presumed
legally sane defendant either did or did not, in fact, possess the re-
quired specific intent or motive.33 The Wells court, however, did not
suggest that it was creating a special defense for the admission of
evidence of a defendant's mental abnormalities to show he was less
responsible than a person not suffering from a mental defect. In fact,
the court made very clear that the defendant's capacity to form the
mens rea was not an issue before the court.3" The type of evidence
admitted in Wells was not relevant because it bore on the defendant's
capacity to form a specific mens rea; rather, the evidence was rele-
vant because it bore directly on the issue of actual formation." The
evidence tended to show that because of his mental abnormality, the
defendant formed a mental state which was inconsistent with the re-
quisite mens rea.
28. 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949).
29. Id. at 334, 202 P.2d at 56.
30. Id. at 345, 202 P.2d at 62.
31. Id. at 346, 202 P.2d at 62.
32. Id. at 345, 202 P.2d at 62.
33. Id. at 351, 202 P.2d at 66.
34. Id. at 356-57, 202 P.2d at 69-70. "Here the offer was to show not insanity, not a
lack of mental capacity to have malice aforethought, but, rather, the fact of nervous tension
and the particular tension was directly relevant to the issue of purpose, motive, or intent...."
Id.
35. Id.
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A decade later, the California Supreme Court in People v. Gorshen36
reaffirmed, and to a certain extent, expanded the holding of Wells.
When the defendant, a longshoreman, reported to work intoxicated
on the day of the crime, his foreman told him to go home. After
Gorshen refused to leave, the two men engaged in a brief altercation,
and Gorshen threatened to return and kill his foreman. Gorshen went
home, got his gun, returned to the dock, and carried out his threat."
In addition to introducing evidence of Gorshen's intoxication, the
defendant introduced psychiatric testimony at trial which indicated
that he was suffering from a mental disease at the time of the killing.38
The psychiatrist described the effects of the disease on the defendant,
and concluded that the defendant "did not have the mental state re-
quired for malice aforethought or premediation or anything which
implies intention, deliberation, or premeditation." '39 The trial judge,
apparently relying to a certain extent upon the expert testimony, found
that although the defendant failed to premeditate and deliberate, he
did not lack malice aforethought. The defendant, therefore, was found
guilty of second, rather than first degree murder. On appeal, the
supreme court affirmed the conviction and endorsed the admissibility
of the expert testimony as having been received properly in accor-
dance with Wells."°
In reaching its conclusion, the Gorshen court expanded the scope
of admissible evidence beyond that of Wells. The expert in Gorshen
expressed his opinion on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant
actually formed the mens rea.4' In contrast, the doctors in Wells did
not express any opinions about whether the defendant actually formed
the requisite intent. All inferences relating to the ultimate issue were
left for the jury to decide.4 2
The California Supreme Court recently extended even further the
scope of the strict mens rea approach. In People v. Wetmore,'3 the
defendant was charged with burglary. At trial, the defendant attemp-
ted to introduce psychiatric reports to show that as a result of men-
tal illness, he failed to form the specific intent to commit a theft
or any felony when he entered the apartment." The reports explained
36. 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959).
37. Id. at 720-21, 336 P.2d at 494-95.
38. Id. at 722, 336 P.2d at 495.
39. Id. at 723, 336 P.2d at 496.
40. Id. at 726, 336 P.2d at 498.
41. Id. at 723, 336 P.2d at 496.
42. See 33 Cal. 2d at 330, 202 P.2d at 53.
43. 22 Cal. 3d 318, 583 P.2d 1308, 149 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1978).
44. Id. at 321-22, 583 P.2d at 1310-1311, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 267-68.
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that the defendant had a long history of mental illness and that he
began to believe that he owned property. When Wetmore arrived at
the victim's apartment, he found the door unlocked and was certain
that the apartment was his. Once inside, he redecorated the apart-
ment and donned the victim's clothes. The defendant was shocked
and embarrassed when the police arrived. Only then did he realize
that he did not own the apartment.4 5 The trial court refused to admit
the psychiatric reports because the reports contained evidence of in-
sanity, which the Wells court, in dictum, considered inadmissible,
because the reports also contained evidence that the defendant failed
to form the requisite mens rea. 46 On appeal, the supreme court re-
jected the Wells dictum, holding that evidence which shows a defen-
dant could not form the mens rea is admissible in the guilt phase
of trial to prove the defendant did not form the requisite intent, even
though this evidence also is probative of insanity.47 The Wetmore deci-
sion expanded the strict mens rea approach to permit the admission
of any evidence in the guilt phase that shows the defendant did not
actually form the requisite intent.
Although neither the Gorshen nor the Wetmore holding extended
beyond the strict mens rea approach, both cases did permit introduc-
tion of evidence that was inadmissible in Wells. Gorshen accepted
expert testimony on the ultimate issue of whether the defendant ac-
tually formed the mens rea.45 Wetmore sanctioned introduction of
any mental health evidence which showed that the defendant did or
did not form the requisite intent, regardless of whether that evidence
also was probative of insanity.49
Even with the expansion of Gorshen and Wetmore, the strict mens
rea approach was extremely narrow in scope. None of the cases men-
tioned above allowed the introduction of evidence designed to show
that the defendant suffered from a mental disease that impaired his
ability to form the required mental state. In each case, the court ruled
on the admissibility of evidence designed to show that the defendant
suffered from an abnormality which could have prevented the for-
mation of a specific mens rea. The supreme court did not indicate
an intent to create a special theory for admitting evidence of mental
45. Id.
46. Id. at 322-23, 583 P.2d at 1311-12, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 268-69.
47. Id. at 324, 583 P.2d at 1312, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269. The court did not hold that
evidence of insanity is always relevant to the issue of formation. A person can be insane and
still form the required mental state. See Diamond, supra note 11 at 62.
48. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d at 723, 336 P.2d at 496.
49. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d at 324, 583 P.2d at 1312, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
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abnormality in the guilt phase of trial as a means of showing that
the defendant was less capable of forming the mens rea, and therefore,
that he was less responsible." In each case, the court admitted the
expert testimony because it was relevant to the issue of whether the
defendant actually formed the required mental state.
The supreme court, however, has deviated at times from the strict
mens rea approach. The court has admitted expert testimony under
a broader approach that is similar to a diminished responsibility theory.
The following discussion demonstrates this expansion of the diminished
capacity defense.
B. Diminished Capacity Defense in California: Beyond a Strict
Mens Rea Approach?
As demonstrated, in some cases mental abnormality will prevent
a person from entertaining a specific intent.51 In the majority of cases,
however, a severely disordered defendant still may form the required
intent of the highest offense charged.52 In People v. Wolff " the
California Supreme Court faced a situation in which the defendant
suffered from a mental disorder but nonetheless was able to form the
requisite intent. The defendant in Wolff, a fifteen year old boy, was
charged with the first degree murder of his mother.54 He was ob-
sessed with the idea of bringing certain girls to his home so that he
could rape them or photograph them in the nude. To accomplish this,
he decided to kill his mother. Several days prior to the crime, the
defendant obtained an axe handle from the family garage and hid
it under the mattress of his bed. Wolff completed his plan by strik-
ing his mother several times with the axe handle and then choking
her to death as she attempted to escape. He then turned himself in
to the police. 5 The jury found Wolff legally sane despite a consen-
sus of expert testimony that he was insane at the time of the killing.56
The expert testimony, however, did not establish that Wolff lacked
the mental capacity to premeditate or deliberate, nor did the testimony
show that he did not in fact form the required mental states. 7 The
psychiatric testimony simply showed that Wolff was mentally ill at
50. See Arenella, supra note 14, at 839.
51. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
52. See Diamond, supra note 11, at 62.
53. 61 Cal. 2d 795, 394 P.2d 959, 40 Cal. Rptr. 271 (1964).
54. Id. at 799, 394 P.2d at 961, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 273.
55. Id. at 806-07, 394 P.2d at 965, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78.
56. Id. at 803-04, 394 P.2d at 964, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
57. Id.
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the time of the crime. Seemingly, if the strict mens rea approach were
applied, Wolff would not have been able to introduce evidence of
his mental illness because that evidence failed to demonstrate that
he did not, in fact, form the requisite intent.
The supreme court avoided this result by extending the traditional
requirements of premeditation and deliberation to include the extent
to which the defendant could reflect maturely and meaningfully upon
the gravity of his comtemplated act. 8 The court implied that the
legislature, in dividing the crime of murder into degrees, recognized
a difference in the measure of moral culpability between first and
second degree murder. 9 The court also implied that this expanded
definition of premeditation provided a method for determining a defen-
dant's moral turpitude.6" By expanding the definition of premedita-
tion, evidence of Wolff's mental illness, otherwise inadmissible under
the strict mens rea approach, became relevant because it tended to
show that the defendant was not capable of reflecting "maturely and
meaningfully". This evidence, therefore, was directly relevant to the
issue of whether the defendant premeditated and deliberated. 61
Reinterpreting the traditional definitions of premeditation and
deliberation in this manner permitted the court to reduce the convic-
tion to second degree murder,62 while still claiming to follow the
strict mens rea approach. Commentators, however, have suggested
that this interpretation effectively shifted the mens rea inquiry away
from whether the defendant actually formed the required intent, to
a jury inquiry aimed at assessing the defendant's ability to morally
evaluate or control his behavior. 3 In subsequent cases, the court
evidenced a further shifting toward an approach similar to dimin-
ished responsibility. In People v. Conley,64 for example, the court
defined malice aforethought to include a requirement that the defen-
dant be able to comprehend his duty to act within the law.6 ' In Con-
ley the supreme court again dealt with a defendant whose conduct
apparently satisfied all the traditional elements of first degree murder.
The defendant shot and killed his lover and her husband three days
after his lover ended their affair. At trial, the defendant introduced
58. Id. at 821, 394 P.2d at 975, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287.
59. Id. at 822, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
60. Id. at 820, 394 P.2d at 974, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 286 (citing People v. Holt, 25 Cal.
2d 59, 89, 153 P.2d 21, 37 (1944)).
61. Wolff, 61 Cal. 2d at 821-22, 394 P.2d at 975,76, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 287-88.
62. Id. at 823, 394 P.2d at 976, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 288.
63. See Morse, supra note 17 at 11; see also Arenella, supra note 14, at 843.
64. 64 Cal. 2d 322, 411 P.2d 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. 822 (1966).
65. Id. at 315, 411 P.2d 'at 913-14, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
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evidence showing that for the three days prior to, and on the day
of the killing, he had been drinking heavily. On the day of the murder,
Conley bought a rifle, practiced shooting, and told friends on two
occasions that he was going to kill the couple. 6" The defendant also
introduced expert testimony showing that at the time of the shooting,
he was in a dissociative state and because of personality fragmenta-
tion did not function normally.67 The court denied the defendant's
requested manslaughter instructions. Subsequently, the defendant was
convicted of first degree murder.
68
The supreme court reversed the conviction, finding that a diminished
capacity instruction should have been given on the issue of malice
aforethought.6 9 The court held that, "if because of mental defect,
disease, or intoxication.. .the defendant is unable to comprehend his
duty to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law,
he does not act with malice aforethought .... -"0 Thus, malice became
a separate element requiring a showing that the defendant had the
ability to understand his duty under the law.
7'
None of the expert testimony in Conley suggested that the defen-
dant in fact did not form the traditional mental states for murder.
72
In much the same manner, as Wolff expanded the definition of
premeditation and deliberation, the court in Conley expanded the
definition of malice to include an element to which the expert testimony
was relevant. The test for malice as expanded by Conley technically
is consistent with the strict mens rea approach because it allows
evidence of mental abnormality to show that a defendant failed to
form a specific mental state (awareness of duty). In fact, however,
the expanded definition allows juries to hear evidence of a defen-
dant's mental illness to make a judgment about the moral culpability
of the person.
In People v. Poddar,71 the supreme court extended the definition
of malice, as applied to second degree murder, beyond malice as de-
fined by Conley. The court explained that implied malice required
an awareness of a duty to act within the law and an ability to act
within the law.7" By requiring that a defendant be capable of acting
66. Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
67. Id. at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
68. Id. at 314, 411 P.2d at 913, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
69. Id. at 323, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
70. Id. at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
71. Id.
72. See Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 315, 411 P.2d at 914, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
73. 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, Ill Cal. Rptr. at 910 (1974).
74. Id. at 758, 518 P.2d at 348, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 916.
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within the law, the court implied that evidence which showed a defen-
dant acted under an irrestible impulse would be admissible to prove
diminished capacity. But for the judicial expansion of the traditional
implied malice definition, evidence of an irresistible impulse would
not be admissible under the strict mens rea approach because this
evidence only indicates the defendant's motive, not whether the re-
quisite intent in fact was formed. The requirement of a showing that
the defendant is capable of acting within the law results, once again,
in a focus on why the defendant acted the way he did, rather than
on the issue of actual formation of intent. The holding in Poddar,
therefore, effectively extends the parameters of admissible mental health
evidence to include psychiatric testimony about a defendant's voli-
tional capacity.
As this author has demonstrated, the supreme court in Woff, Con-
ley, and Poddar shifted the focus of the mens rea inquiry from assess-
ing whether a defendant actually formed a specific intent to evaluating
why and how the defendant entertained the requisite mental state."
By expanding the mental states required for various degrees of homicide
to include something more than the intent to commit the specific harm,
the California Supreme Court effectively permitted the introduction
of mental health testimony to show that the defendant was less culpable
as a result of his mental abnormality, even if he intended the harm
done.716 While very few mental abnormalities are capable of prevent-
ing the formation of traditional mental states such as the intent to
kill, many mental diseases may prevent a person from "maturely and
meaningfully reflecting" or "comprehending his duty to govern his
actions in accord with the duty imposed by law"."
By incorporating these mental states into traditional notions of
premeditation and malice, the court was able to allow evidence of
the defendant's mental abnormality to mitigate his culpability, and
simultaneously, to justify introduction of the evidence as being rele-
vant to negate a required mental state. Although the court technically
was able to follow a strict mens rea approach, the California diminish-
ed capacity defense was expanded well beyond the strict mens rea
approach of Wells and Gorshen until it more closely resembled
diminished responsibility." As discussed earlier, redefining the tradi-
75. See supra notes 51-74 and accompanying text.
76. See Arenella, supra note 14, at 844.
77. Telephone interview with Dr. Captane Thomson, Director of Mental Health, Yolo
County, California (December 18, 1983) (notes on file at the PaciJfic Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Thomson].
78. See Arenella, supra note 14, at 847.
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tional elements of premeditation, deliberation, and malice to include
"mature and meaningful reflection" and "awareness of duty"
broadened the relevance of mental health testimony because many
mental illnesses can affect a person's ability to maturally and mean-
ingfully reflect."' The following section will examine the criticisms of
this increased use of psychiatric evidence. The measures taken by the
California Legislature to prevent further judicial expansion of the
diminished capacity defense and to restrict the use of mental health
testimony in the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial will also be explored.
STATUTORY REFORM OF THE DIMINISHED CAPACITY DEFENSE IN
CA FORIA
In response to a request by the California Supreme Court to take
action80 and to public outcry following controversial verdicts,8 the
Joint Committee for the Revision of the Penal Code held two public
hearings. One hearing was entitled "Role of Psychiatry in Determin-
ing Criminal Responsibility, '82 and the other "Defenses of Diminished
Capacity and Insanity." t 3 Testimony at these hearings revealed several
criticisms of the diminished capacity defense. An examination of these
criticisms will help place the legislative reforms of the diminished
capacity defense into context.
A. Legislative Hearings
One criticism raised at the hearings was that use of the diminished
capacity defenle results in a duplication of the evidence offered at
trial because evidence of the defendant's mental health must be
presented in both the guilt and insanity phases.8" The California
Supreme Court viewed this repetition as "a pointless waste of judicial
time and resources." '
A second criticism was that a defendant who successfully raises a
diminished capacity defense either is found guilty of a lesser included
offense or acquitted of all charges. While a defendant found not guilty
by reason of insanity necessarily would be treated for his mental
disorder, a successful diminished capacity defendant either would be
79. See Thomson, supra note 77.
80. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d at 331, 583 P.2d at 1317, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
81. See, e.g., People v. White 117 Cal. App. 3d 270, 172 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1981).
82. Role of Psychiatry, supra note 2.
83. Hearing on The Defenses of Diminished Capacity and Insanity, JOINT CotiNrrrEr FOR
THE REVISION OF THE PENAL CODE (Dec. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Defenses].
84. Id. at 17.
85. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d at 331, 583 P.2d at 1317, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
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given complete freedom or be sent to a regular prison. 6 In either
case, the defendant who is successful in using the diminished capa-
city defense does not receive proper psychiatric treatment.
A third and perhaps most frequent criticism raised at the hearings,
dealt with the growing skepticism among the bar, mental health pro-
fessionals, and laypersons concerning the accuracy of psychiatric
opinions. 7 These critics were divided i0td several camps. One group
believed that mental health experts were not qualified to express opin-
ions on whether a defendant actually formed a particular mens rea
or had the capacity to form a specific intent at the time the crime
was committed. 8 Others thought psychiatrists and psychologists were
not qualified to express any type of opinion as to the defendant's
past or present mental condition. 9 Still another group believed that
mental health experts were not qualified to express opinions concern-
ing a defendant's present capacity or actual formation, or his capa-
city or actual formation at the time of the alleged criminal act.9"
A fourth criticism of the diminished capacity defense was that by
allowing psychiatrists to express opinions on whether a defendant ac-
tually formed the requisite intent or possessed the capacity to form
a specific mens rea, the jury effectively was stripped of its function
as ultimate trier of fact.91 Thus the sole function of the jury in deter-
mining whether the defendant formed the mental state would be to
assess the expert's credibility.
The fifth and final criticism of the defense was that the diminished
capacity defense was not functioning as intended. 2 In theory, the jury
must consider all psychiatric evidence and then determine whether the
defendant actually formed the specific mens rea at the time the crime
allegedly was committed. Several speakers at the hearings, however,
indicated that this was not what juries were doing. Instead of evaluating
the expert testimony and making their own determinations as to ac-
tual formation, the juries were basing decisions improperly on their
attitudes toward a particular defendant. 93 If the members of the jury
sympathize with a defendant because, for example, he was a family
man with no prior record and a good reputation in the community,
they would use the expert testimony to find that he did not form
86. Defenses, supra note 83, at 3-4.
87. See infra notes 88-90 and accompanyinag text.
88. See Defenses, supra note 83, at 3, 12, 157.
89. See id. at 8-11.
90. See id. at 83, 100, 152.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 19, 20, 120, 122, 143-44.
93. Id.
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the particular mens rea. On the other hand, if the jury felt extreme
animosity toward the defendant because he was a person with a long
criminal record and the acts with which he had been charged were
particularly gruesome, the jury would find that he did form the par-
ticular mens rea. One of the speakers who addressed this criticism
referred to this improper conduct by juries ag the "hidden agenda"
which lurked behind jury determinations.9 '
The public hearings held by the Joint Committee for the Revision
of the Penal Code resulted in the drafting of legislation to reform
the diminished capacity defense. As will be shown in the next sec-
tion, the reforms were designed to restrict the admissibility of
psychiatric testimony in the guilt phase of bifurcated trials and limit
the diminished capacity defense as severely as is constitutionally
permissible.
B. Legislative Changes
To resolve the criticisms of the diminished capacity defense expressed
at the hearings, the California Legislature in 1981 passed Senate Bill
54.95 In 1982, the voters of California also enacted into law Proposi-
tion 8, "The Victims' Bill of Rights," an initiative measure which
in part affected the diminished capacity defense.96 Senate Bill 54
amended sections 21, 22, 26, 188, and 189 of the Penal Code and
added to the code sections 28 and 29. The purpose of the amend-
ments, as will be shown, is rather obvious. Penal Code sections 28
and 29, however, have been severely criticized as introducing an in-
calculable amount of confusion into the law of evidence97 and as having
an unclear effect on the diminished capacity defense.9"
As will be demonstrated, the language of subdivisions (a) and (b)
of Penal Code section 28 is ambiguous. As written, the two subdivi-
sions appear inconsistent. Penal Code section 25, added by Proposi-
tion 8, also seems to contradict section 28. The following sections
of this comment will employ extrinsic aids to resolve the ambiguities
and harmonize the apparent inconsistencies in the new Penal Code
94. See id. at 170, 173.
95. 1981 Cal. Stat. c. 404, §§1-7, at 1591-93.
96. "The Victims' Bill of Rights," Proposition 8, Criminal Justice - Initiative Statutes
and Constitutional Amendment, approved by the California Voters on June 8, 1982 [hereinafter
cited as Proposition 8]. Section 4 of Proposition 8 adds California Penal Code section 25.
97. Tochterman, Psychiatric Defenses and Testimony (1981) (on file at the Pacific Law
Journal) (Judge Tochterman is a Judge of the Superior Court, County of Sacramento, California).
98. Comment, Senate Bill 54: Legislative Attack on Mens Rea Defense, 17 U.S.F. L. REv.
307, 308.
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provisions. Each of the new measures will be analyzed to determine
the extent to which mental health evidence is admissible in the guilt
phase of a bifurcated trial and to ascertain the current state of the
diminished capacity defense in California.
1. Interpretation of Penal Code Section 28 Subdivision (a)
The wording of subdivision (a) has created tremendous confusion
and uncertainty about the admissibility of mental health evidence in
the guilt phase of bifurcated trials.99 Subdivision (a), in pertinent part,
currently reads:100
(a) Evidence of mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder
shall not be admitted to negate the capacity to form any mental
state, including, but not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge,
premeditation, deliberation or malice aforethought, with which the
accused committed the act. Evidence of mental disease, mental defect,
or mental disorder is admissible solely on the issue whether or not
the accused actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated,
deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent
crime is charged.
Generally, the rules relating to construction of statutes are applicable
only when statutory language is unclear and ambiguous.1"1 The first
step in the process of statutory construction, therefore, is to examine
the language of the statute for ambiguity. 10 2 Legislative enactments
should be construed in accordance with the common or ordinary mean-
ing of the language used.10 3
The first sentence of subdivision (a) states that evidence concern-
ing a defendant's mental health is inadmissible "to negate the capacity
to form any mental states ..... 4 The word "negate" means to deny
the existence or fact of something.0 5 The ordinary meaning, then,
of the first sentence of subdivision (a) would appear to be that evidence
of mental disease is inadmissible if offered to show the defendant
lacked capacity to form the required mental state. The wording of
the first sentence, however, does not indicate whether the restriction
applies only to evidence which is offered to show that the defendant
99. See Tochterman, supra note 97.
100. CAL. PENAL CODE §28 (as amended by 1982 Cal. Stat. c. 893, §3, at 148).
101. See Leffel v. Municipal Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 569, 572, 126 Cal. Rptr. 773, 774-75
(1976).
102. See Smith v. Rhea, 72 Cal. App. 3d 361, 365, 140 Cal. Rptr. 116, 118 (1977).
103. See Madrid v. Justice Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 819, 824, 125 Cal. Rptr. 348, 350-51
(1975).
104. CAL. PENAL CODE §28(a).
105. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged (1971)).
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completely lacked capacity to form the requisite intent, or whether
the limitation also applies to evidence offered to show only that the
defendant's capacity was impaired somewhat. Given its plain and or-
dinary meaning, the term "negate" could be interpreted to prohibit
any attempt by the defendant to deny the existence of even a portion
of his capacity to form the required mental state. Just as likely an
interpretation of the word, however, could be that negation only refers
to evidence which is offered to show that the defendant totally lack-
ed capacity and not to evidence designed to establish that the defen-
dant's capacity was simply impaired. If the first interpretation is given
to the term "negate," then all evidence of the defendant's capacity
would be barred. But, according to the second possible meaning of
"negate" a defendant could produce evidence of a diminished men-
tal capacity because such evidence would only establish an impaired
ability and would not prove the defendant was incapable of forming
the required intent. Thus, given the plain meaning of the word, at
least two conflicting results are possible.
The meaning of subdivision (a) is even more uncertain when the
first and second sentences of the subdivision are read together. The
second sentence permits introduction of mental health evidence solely
on the issue of whether the defendant actually formed the requisite
intent.' 6 One possible interpretation of subdivision (a) is that the two
sentences are hopelessly irreconcilable. Subdivision (a) has been in-
terpreted to mean the defense may introduce evidence to show the
defendant did not form the requisite intent, but he may not offer
evidence to prove that he could not have formed the required mental
state.' 7 One commentator has suggested that this interpretation is like
allowing a defendant to show he did not shoot the victim but, at
the same time, refusing to permit him to prove the gun was not
loaded." 8 This interpretation, although reasonable from the face of
the statute, faces constitutional challenge.10 9 This construction also
violates the dictum of the California Supreme Court in People v.
Wetmore."' The court in Wetmore stated that any proof which tended
to show that a mental state could not exist should be admissible to
106. See CAL. PENAL CODE §28(a).
107. See People v. McCowan, 3 Crim. 12853 3d District Court of Appeal, Appellant Brief
at 11-12; see also Tochterman, supra note 97.
108. See Tochterman, supra note 97.
109. See People v. McCowan, 3 Crim. 12853 3rd District Court of Appeal, Appellant Brief
at 11-12; see also comment, supra note 8 at 1202-1209.
110. 22 Cal. 3d at 324, 583 P.2d at 1312, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269. "As a matter of logic,
any proof tending to show that a certain mental condition could not exist is relevant and should
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show that the mental state did not exist."' Courts should not infer
a legislative intent to act unconstitutionally if the statutory language
can be interpreted in a way that would constitutionally serve the policy
of the statute." 2 Courts must also attempt to find a meaning consis-
tent with constitutional requirements if this can be done by a fair
and reasonable construction." 3
Another possible interpretation of subdivision (a) is that the first
sentence of the subdivision is a general prohibition against capacity
evidence. The second sentence, rather than being irreconcilable, simply
provides an exception to the general ban on capacity evidence. Thus,
under this construction, if the evidence sought to be admitted is pro-
bative of both capacity and whether the defendant actually formed
the requisite intent then the evidence would be admissible. ' 4 Subdivi-
sion (a) is ambiguous, because when given its plain and ordinary mean-
ing, the wording is subject to several reasonable interpretations and
is apparently internally inconsistent.
When the meaning of a statute is uncertain, extrinsic aids may be
used to ascertain the probable intent of the legislature." 5 Committee
reports, committee hearings, and the history of the statute are all rele-
vant evidence of legislative intent.' 6 Unfortunately, no legislative
analysis was done on the final version of Senate Bill 54 because it
was amended after leaving committee."' A bill analysis, however, was
completed on the amended version that immediately preceded the bill
as enacted."' Because nearly all of Senate Bill 54 remained unchanged
after leaving committee, this analysis is helpful in determining the
general purpose of the bill in its final form.
Evidence of the legislative intent behind Senate Bill 54 can be found
by examining the amendments to Penal Code sections 21, 26, 188
be admissible to show that it did not exist. And, of course, proof that something did not
exist is the best possible evidence that it did not exist." Id.
111. Id.
112. See In re Kay, I Cal. 3d 930, 942, 464 P.2d 142, 150, 83 Cal. Rptr. 686, 694 (1970).
113. See County of Los Angeles v. Legg, 5 Cal. 2d 349, 353, 55 P.2d 206, 207 (1936).
114. See infra notes 137-149 and accompanying text.
115. See Morse v. Municipal Court, 13 Cal. 3d 149, 156, 529 P.2d 46, 50, 118 Cal. Rptr.
14, 18 (1974).
116. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as Ex-
trinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 CAL. W.L. Rv. 128, 130 (1972).
117. Telephone interview with Edward (Ned) Cohen, Project Director, Revision of the Penal
Code Committee (December 15, 1983) (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Telephone Interview].
118. Further Analysis of Senate Bill 54 (as amended in Committee June 29, 1981, Assembly
Committee on Criminal Justice, Terry Goggin, Chairman [hereinafter cited as Analysis]). This
analysis was done on the final amended version of SB 54 while still in committee. Id.
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and 189. Each of these sections was amended by Senate Bill 54. 9
As will be shown, every amendment was designed to restrict some
use of mental health testimony in the guilt phase of bifurcated trials.'
Understanding the purpose of these amendments will aid in discover-
ing the intent of Senate Bill 54 generally and of section 28 specifically.
Prior to the enactment of Senate Bill 54, Penal Code section 21
provided that a defendant's intent could be proved both by the cir-
cumstances connected with the offense and by showing that the defen-
dant was of sound mind and discretion.' 2 ' All persons were presumed
to be of sound mind who were neither idiots, lunatics, nor affected
with insanity. 2 Thus, Penal Code section 21, prior to amendment,
provided that intent could be rebutted by a showing of mental ill-
ness. Currently, however, section 21 provides that intent may be shown
simply by the circumstances connected with the offenses. 23 By
eliminating the requirement of showing that the defendant was of
sound mind to prove intent, the legislature seems to indicate that a
defendant's mental disorder is not necessarily relevant in determining
whether he actually intended the criminal act. The manner in which
section 21 was amended is some indication that the legislature intended
to limit the use of mental health evidence in the guilt phase of trial.
Penal Code section 26, as amended by Senate Bill 54, eliminates
lunatics and insane persons from the category of persons incapable
of committing crimes.' 2 According to the staff of the Joint Commit-
tee for the Revision of the Penal Code, this amendment was designed
to prohibit a ruling by the courts that a finding of insanity may oc-
cur in the guilt phase of trial. 12  This amendment shows that the
legislature was concerned not only with restricting current uses of men-
tal health evidence, but also with the need to preclude future expan-
sion of this type of evidence in the guilt phase.
Penal Code sections 188 and 189, as amended, specifically over-
ruled the expansive definitions of premeditation and malice as redefined
by the California Supreme Court in Wolff, Conley, and Poddar. Senate
Bill 54 amended section 189 by adding a provision which specifically
119. Senate Bill 54 as amended in Assembly June 29, 1981; see also Analysis, supra note
118, at 1-9.
120. See infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
121. Enacted 1872 based on Crime and Punishment Act §§2, 3 (1850 Cal. Stat. c. 99, §§2,
3 at 229).
122. Id.
123. CAL. PENAL CODE §21.
124. Compare id. §26 with 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1181, §1, at 5285 (amending CAL. PENAL
CODE §26).
125. See Analysis, supra note 118, at 6.
1984 / Diminished Capacity
eliminated the Wolff requirement. 26 Section 189 now clearly provides
that to prove that a killing was deliberate and premeditated, the pro-
secution need not show the defendant maturely or meaningfully
reflected upon the gravity of his act." 7
Penal Code Section 188, which defines express and implied malice,
was also amended by Senate Bill 54 to eliminate expansive supreme
court definitions. Malice is implied when a killing occurs without con-
siderable provocation, or the circumstances surrounding the killing
show an abandoned and malignant heart.'28 This later phrase has been
defined by the courts to cover situations in which no intent to kill
is manifested. Instead, the killing includes the commission of an act
involving a high probability of death,' 9 accompanied by a wanton
disregard for human life.' 30 The supreme court in Conley and Pod-
dar, however, extended the implied malice definition to require proof
that the defendant possessed the ability to comprehend and be aware
of his duty to act within the general body of laws regulating society.'
Section 188 currently negates these requirements by eliminating the
necessity of finding in the defendant an awareness of the obligation
to conform to the law.'
32
The Wolff, Conley and Poddar expanded definitions of premedita-
tion and malice aforethought greatly increased the relevance of men-
tal disability evidence to determinations of whether those mental
elements of the crime existed. The definitions of those "elements"
were so broad and indeterminate that evidence of mental abnormal-
ity nearly always appeared relevant.' 33 By amending sections 188 and
189, the legislature effectively changed the focus of the mens rea in-
quiry. Rather than determining whether a defendant's mental illness
negated his capacity to appreciate the seriousness of his contemplated
action in a meaningful manner, the focus is on assessing whether he
in fact entertained a specific intent. By statutorily abolishing the
holdings of Wolff, Conley and Poddar, the legislature signaled an
intent to return to the strict mens rea approach of Wells. Consequently,
the relevance of mental health testimony has been greatly reduced.
126. CAL. PENAL, CODE §189.
127. Id.
128. Id. §188.
129. People v. Thomas, 41 Cal. 2d 470, 480, 261 P.2d 1, 7 (1953) (Traynor, J., concurring).
130. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 782, 402 P.2d 130, 134, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442,
446 (1965).
131. See Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 322, 411 P.2d at 918, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 822; Poddar, 10
Cal. 3d at 759-60, 518 P.2d at 349, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 917.
132. CAL. PENAL CODE §188.
133. See supra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
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The purpose, then, of eliminating these judicially expanded defini-
tions was "to place the murder definitions in accord with the pur-
pose of the bill: to eliminate most psychiatric defenses in the guilt
phase." 34
Analysis of the amendments enacted by Senate Bill 54 shows the
legislature intended to vastly restrict the use of mental health testimony
in the guilt phase of bifurcated trials. Although the establishment of
the general purpose behind the amendments effected by Senate Bill
54 is not conclusive evidence of the legislative objective in enacting
Penal Code sections 28 and 29, the amendments do serve as strong
evidence that the legislature had a similar intent when drafting sec-
tions 28 and 29. Any interpretation of sections 28 and 29, therefore,
should be made with reference to the object sought to be accomplished
by Senate Bill 54 to promote the general policy of the statute. 31 One
useful rule of construction is that statutes must be given reasonable
interpretation according to the real, or at least the probable, inten-
tion of the legislature.' 36 As shown, the apparent intent of Senate
Bill 54 was to restrict the use of the mental health testimony and
to focus the mens rea inquiry on actual formation rather than on
whether the defendant was less responsible because an illness diminished
his mental capacity. This general-purpose should be kept in mind while
attempting to resolve the ambiguity and inconsistancy in Penal Code
section 28 subdivision (a).
A possible interpretation of subdivision (a), that is consistent with
the Wetmore dictum '37 and which avoids the constitutional challenges
mentioned earlier, 3 ' is that the provision simply seeks to prevent in-
troduction of mental health evidence which is offered by the defen-
dant only to show that he was less mentally capable, and therefore
less responsible. Under this interpretation, the first sentence of sub-
division (a) is a general prohibition against capacity evidence. The
second sentence, rather than being irreconcilable, simply provides an
exception to the general ban on capacity evidence. If evidence of a
defendant's mental capacity also is relevant to whether the accused
actually formed the required intent, then this evidence is admissible
under the second sentence. This construction is simply a retreat to
134. Analysis, supra note 118, at 7.
135. See In re Andrews, 18 Cal. 3d 208, 212, 555 P.2d 97, 99, 133 Cal. Rptr, 365, 367
(1976); see also People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 273, 497 P.2d 481, 499, 102 Cal. Rptr.
137, 155 (1972).
136. See Dickey v. Raisin Proration Zone, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 802, 151 P.2d 505, 508 (1944).
137. See Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d at 324, 583 P.2d at 1312, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 269.
138. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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the strict mens rea approach that only omits psychiatric testimony
which tends to show the defendant did not entertain the required men-
tal element.' 3 9 Strict mens rea, unlike a diminished capacity approach,
does not admit evidence offered to prove that the defendant was less
capable than a normal person, unless that evidence also establishes
that the mental illness actually prevents the formation of intent.' °
Under this construction, if a specific, intent is an element of the
crime, any evidence relating to existence or absence of that intent
is relevant.' 4 ' Evidence showing the defendant was suffering from a
mental illness that made him less capable than a normal person of
forming the requisite mens rea would be admissible only if probative
of whether he did not in fact form the mens rea.' 2 Read in this man-
ner, subdivision (a) is consistent with an objective of Senate Bill 54
which was "to eliminate the use of diminished responsibility defenses
in the guilt phase .... -,,4 Additionally, this interpretation does not suffer
from constitutional infirmities because all mental health evidence that
is relevant to formation of the required mental state is admissible.
The scope of admissible mental health testimony, in light of the
interpretation of subdivision (a) outlined above, can be demonstrated
best by examples of evidence that would and would not be admissi-
ble. Expert testimony describing some consciously entertained thought
inconsistent with the requisite intent of the crime charged would be
admissible.14  Wells was a perfect example of a defendant who enter-
tained an intent that negated the mens rea of the crime charged. Ex-
perts in Wells testified that because of his mental illness, he over-
reacted to external stimuli so that he mistakenly and irrationally
believed he was acting in self-defense when he assaulted the guard.' 4 5
This testimony would be admitted under the strict mens rea inter-
pretation of subdivision (a) because the evidence goes solely to the
issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed the mens rea.
Evidence that the defendant was acting under a delusion at the time
of the criminal act, however, would not necessarily be admissible under
this interpretation of subdivision (a). In Wetmore, for example, the
defendant's evidence showed that he entered the apartment under the
139. See Arenella, supra note 14, at 830.
140. See id.
141. See id. at 833.
142. See Cohen, The Diminished Capacity Defense: Why Senate Bill 54? JOINT COMMITTEE
FOR THE REVIsIoN OF THE PENAL CODE, at 1 (September 3, 1981); see also Arenella, supra
note 14, at 839.
143. See Analysis, supra note 178, at 3.
144. See id.
145. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d at 344-45, 202 P.2d at 62.
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delusion that he was the owner, and thus, he did not enter with the
intent of committing a theft or felony. 46 This evidence clearly would
be relevant in determining whether the defendant formed the requisite
intent, and would be admissible. In contrast, a defendant who entered
the same apartment under the delusion that God had ordered him
to go inside and kill the occupants would not necessarily be able to
introduce evidence of the delusion under the strict mens rea inter-
pretation of subdivision (a). If the defendant premeditated and
deliberated the killings, he would have entertained the state of mind
required by the crime of first degree murder, notwithstanding his delu-
sional motive. Evidence that his mental illness diminished his voli-
tional ability or impaired his capacity for appreciating the seriousness
of his act would not negate the existence of the requisite mens rea.
In fact, most mentally abnormal offenders are fully capable of
premeditating, deliberating, and performing the contemplated act in
accordance with their preconceived plans.
1 47
The application of the strict mens rea approach in the above ex-
amples is relatively simplistic. A more difficult determination of ad-
missibility, however, arises when a defendant suffering from a men-
tal abnormality that does not impair his ability to form the specific
intent is subject to extreme social pressures such as losing his job,
wife, or close friend. According to one mental health expert, extreme
social pressures could exacerbate an existing mental illness to the ex-
tent that the combination theoretically could prevent formation of
the requisite mens rea.' 48 Under these circumstances, evidence of the
defendant's mental abnormality and the social pressures under which
he was operating would be admissible even though this type of evidence
ordinarily might be inadmissible if offered separately.
A mental health expert conceivably could testify, under the strict
mens rea interpretation of subdivision (a), that a defendant was suf-
fering from a disease in the nature of a psychosis (loss of contact
with reality), which, at times could cause the defendant to become
so confused, bewildered, or perplexed that he could not rationally
premeditate.' 49 This evidence would be admissible because it is directly
relevant to the issue of whether the defendant actually premeditated.
Thus, mental health evidence is admissible under subdivision (a)
whenever it is relevant to show whether the defendant formed the
146. Wetmore, 22 Cal. 3d at 321, 583 P.2d at 1310, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 267.
147. See Diamond, supra note 11, at 62.
148. See Thomson, supra note 77.
149. Id.
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requisite intent. Subdivision (a), however, also must be interpreted
with reference to other parts of section 28. Subdivision (b) of section
28 complicates the determination of what psychiatric evidence is ad-
missible and also casts doubt on the present state of the diminished
capacity defense. Interpretation of subdivision (b) will be accomplished
by examining extrinsic aids to determine the meaning of "diminished
capacity" as it is used in subdivision (b). The following section also
will seek to harmonize subdivisions (a) and (b).
2. Interpretation of Subdivision (b)
Penal Code section 28 subdivision (b) provides that, "As a matter
of public policy there shall be no defense of diminished capacity,
diminished responsibility, or irresistible impulse."' 50 Unfortunately,
subdivision (b) of section 28 does not define the term "dimished capa-
city," and as demonstrated earlier, the term has been used imprecise-
ly and expanded greatly by the courts.15' The term "diminished capa-
city" as used in subdivision (b) could refer to the strict mens rea theory
that a mental defect may negate the existence of an element of a
crime.' 5 Subdivision (b) also could refer to a partial responsibility
approach, which allows testimony of volitional difficulty to be used
to negate a mens rea.' 51 Interpreting subdivision (b) to mean aboli-
tion of diminished capacity in the strict mens rea sense would be in
direct conflict with subdivision (a), which provides that evidence of
mental disorder "is admissible solely on the issue whether or not the
accused actually formed a required specific intent. . .. "s" Constru-
ing various parts of a statute in a way that creates an internal con-
flict violates a rule of construction requiring all parts to be inter-
preted together, and so far as possible, harmonized.'
To harmonize these two subdivisions, the meaning of the term
"diminished capacity" must be assessed. Ambiguity may arise if a
word used in the statutory language, though unambiguous in its com-
monly used sense, has acquired a different technical meaning as a
word of art.' Diminished capacity has been defined variously by
different writers. One writer has defined it as evidence that the defen-
150. CAL. PENAL CODE §28(b).
151. See supra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
152. See People v. Welborn, 257 Cal. App. 2d 513, 521, 65 Cal. Rptr. 8, 14 (1968).
153. See e.g., Conley, 64 Cal. 2d at 322-23, 411 P.2d at 919, 49 Cal. Rptr. at 823.
154. CAL. PENAL CODE §28(a).
155. See Estate of McDill, 14 Cal. 3d 831, 837, 537 P.2d 874, 877, 122 Cal. Rptr. 754,
757 (1975).
156. See Pacific Coast Diary v. Police Court, 214 Cal. 669, 676-77, 178 P.2d 150 (1932).
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dant could not, and therefore did not, form the required mens rea. 11'
Another commentator refers to diminished capacity as an approach
which admits any evidence showing that the accused is less capable
than a normal person of forming the required intent.'58 The authors
of Senate Bill 54 believe that the defense of diminished capacity can
be divided into two variants: the "mens rea variant" and the "par-
tial responsibility variant." 5 9 The "mens rea variant" allows a defen-
dant to use evidence of his mental disorder to negate the specific in-
tent element of the charged offense.' 60 The "partial responsibility
variant" permits the accused to show that because of a mental disabil-
ity, the defendant is less responsible for his actions than a normal
defendant. 16,
According to the authors of Senate Bill 54, the "mens rea variant"
(strict mens rea approach) is not an independent defense and should
not be labeled as diminished capacity.' 6 Rather, the authors contend
the mens rea variant is simply a defense attempt to rebut the pro-
secution's prima facie case by showing that the defendant did not
form the mens rea. ' 63 This view is consistent with both Wells and
Gorshen because in neither of these cases did the court suggest that
it was creating a special defense.
1 64
Thus, the authors of Senate Bill 54 apparently intended subdivi-
sion (b) to eliminate the defense of diminished capacity in the "par-
tial responsibility" sense. In other words, they intended to exclude
diminished capacity as it had been expanded by the supreme court
in Wolff, Conley, and Poddar. These cases permitted admission of
evidence that the accused was less capable than a normal person of
entertaining the relevant mental state. Interpreted in this manner, sub-
division (b) is understood to eliminate diminished capacity as a defense
independent of the strict mens rea approach of subdivision (a). When
read together, subdivisions (a) and (b) are not inconsistent; rather,
together they simply attempt to restrict the judicially created doctrine
of diminished capacity to the strict mens rea approach, as broadened
by Gorshen and Wetmore, and prevent the courts from developing
any partial responsibility defense in the future.
157. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1198.
158. See Arenella, supra note 14, at 830. As defined in this article, diminished capacity
is essentially the equivalent to diminished responsibility. Id.





164. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
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Construing subdivisions (a) and (b) as outlined, restricts mental
health evidence in the guilt phase of bifurcated trials. Under this in-
terpretation of section 28, evidence of a defendant's mental abnor-
mality is admissible only if relevant to show that he did or did not
actually form the mental state for the crime charged. Senate Bill 54
also added Penal Code section 29, which prevents mental health ex-
perts from stating opinions on whether a defendant did or did not
form the required intent. Therefore, this section must be examined
to determine how section 29 affects the admissibility of psychiatric
testimony.
3. Penal Code Section 29: Limitation on Ultimate Issue
Testimony
One of the criticisms mentioned in the hearings before the Joint
Committee on the Revision of the Penal Code was that testimony
by mental health experts on the ultimate issue of whether the defen-
dant actually formed the required mental state denied the jury of its
function. '65 Penal Code section 29 is the legislative response to this
problem.' 66 Section 29 prohibits experts from offering an opinion on
whether the defendant actually formed or failed to form the required
mens rea.' 67 This provision specifies that the question of whether the
defendant formed the requisite mental element is to be decided solely
by the jury.' 68 Thus, under section 29, psychiatrists and psychologists
must avoid committing one way or the other on ultimate legal issues
such as whether the defendant premeditated and deliberated, or whether
the defendant had the capacity to harbor malice aforethought. By
limiting expert testimony in this way, the legislature apparently in-
tended to reduce the possible prejudical effects of psychiatric opinion
and emphasize the role of a jury in deciding whether the defendant
actually formed the requisite mental state.
Senate Bill 54 has affected considerable change in the diminished
capacity defense. The relevance of mental health evidence in the guilt
phase of trials has been restricted severely by the definitional changes
of Penal Code sections 21, 22, 26, 188, 189, and by sections 28 and
29.169 In addition to these legislative changes, the people of Califor-
nia also approved Proposition 8 which, in part, affected the diminished
165. Defenses, supra note 83, at 100, 152.
166. CAL. PENAL CODE §29.
167. See Analysis, supra note 118, at 6.
168. Id.
169. See supra notes 112-124 and accompanying text.
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capacity defense. As will be shown, however, the impact of Proposi-
tion 8 on the diminished capacity defense is minimal.
C. Effect of Propositon 8 on Diminished Capacity
On June 8, 1982, the California voters enacted Proposition 8 by
initiative measure. 7 -Proposition 8 added section 25 to the Penal Code.
Section 25 provides in pertinent part:
17'
(a) The defense of diminished capacity is hereby abolished. In a
criminal action, as well as any juvenile court proceeding, evidence
concerning an accused person's intoxication, trauma, mental illness,
disease, or defect shall not be admissible to show or negate capacity
to form the particular purpose, intent, motive, malice aforethought,
knowledge, or other mental state required for the commission of
the crime charged.
(c) Notwithstanding the foregoing, evidence of diminished capa-
city or of a mental disorder may be considered by the court only
at the time of sentencing or other disposition or commitment.
Subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 25 sets forth a prohibition
on the introduction of mental health evidence that is virtually iden-
tical to Penal Code Section 28, subdivision (a). One difference be-
tween the two provisions is that subdivision (a) of section 25, in ad-
dition to prohibiting the introduction of evidence concerning a defen-
dant's mental abnormality for the purpose of negating a defendant's
capacity, also prohibits the introduction of this evidence for the pur-
pose of showing defendant's capacity.' 72 In addition, unlike subdivi-
sion (a) of section 28, section 25 makes no provision for the admis-
sion of mental health evidence on the issue of actual formation.'73
Given its ordinary meaning, "show" is synonymous with
"demonstrate."' 7 " The word "show" in subdivision (a) of section 25,
therefore, would prohibit the prosecution from introducing mental
health evidence to demonstrate that the defendant possessed the capa-
city to form the mental element. This additional prohibition avoids
the potential constitutional attack on section 28 based on the argu-
ment that subdivision (a) prohibits the defendant from using mental
illness to negate capacity, but allows the prosecution to show capacity.
The failure of section 25 subdivision (a) to provide for the introduc-
170. See Proposition 8, supra note 96.
171. CAL. PENAL CODE §25.
172. Id.
173. Compare id. §25(a) with id. §28(a).
174. WEBSTER'S Tm iw NEw INTERNATIONAL DiCTIONARY (unabridged 1971).
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tion of evidence on actual formation would appear not to be a serious
flaw, except that subdivision (c) only permits evidence of diminished
capacity to be- considered by the court at the time of sentencing. '
One possible construction of subdivision (c) is that it prohibits the
use of evidence indicating a mental disorder to show the defendant
failed to form the required mental state.'76 This construction would
be consistent with the summary of the legislative analyst.' 77 This in-
terpretation, however, would almost certainly make the provision
unconstitutional.'
78
A more plausible interpretation of subdivision (c) is that it does
not conflict with section 28, but instead, is aimed at solving the same
problem.' 7 Subdivision (a) is a general provision which only bars con-
sideration of mental abnormality "to show or negate capacity," but
evidence of mental defect is not explictly barred to show lack of ac-
tual formation.'8 0 Subdivision (c) bars the court from considering men-
tal disorder except at sentencing or disposition.'"' Read together, sub-
divisions (a) and (c) indicate that subdivision (c) does not bar evidence
offered to prove the lack of actual formation of intent at the guilt
phase of trial. ' 2 Subdivision (c), rather, means that evidence, inad-
missible at the guilt phase (relating to responsibility) may still be con-
sidered by the court at the time of sentencing.' 3 This conclusion is
supported by use of "the court" rather than the "trier of fact."'8 4
Further support for this argument can be found by the rule of con-
struction that statutes should not be viewed in a manner that creates
a conflict between them, but should be harmonized if possible.' 5
Interpreted in this way, Penal Code sections 25 and 28 are not in-
consistent or contradictory. Moreover, section 25 does not alter the
175. CAL. PENAL CODE §25(c).
176. Analysis of Proposition 8 of the Criminal Justice Initiative, Assembly Committee on
Criminal Justice at 36.
177. California Secretary of State, California Ballot Pamphlet 55 (Primary Election June
8, 1982). "The measure would prohibit the use of evidence concerning a defendant's intoxica-
tion, trauma, mental illness, disease, or defect for the purpose of proving or contesting whether
a defendant had a certain state of mind in connection with the commission of a crime." Id.
178. Analysis of Proposition 8 the Criminal Justice Initiative, ASSEMLY COMmTTEE ON
CRrMiNAL JusTicE at 36; see also Comment, supra note 8, at 1202-08.
179. Attorney General's Guide to Proposition 8, Victims' Bill of Rights, Office of the At-
torney General, California Department of Justice (June 1982) at 8-2 [hereinafter cited as Guide].
180. Id. at 8-4.
181. CAL. PENAL CODE §25(c).
182. See Guide, supra note 179, at 8-4.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185 Fuentes v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 16 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 547 P.2d 449,
453, 128 Cal. Rptr. 673, 677 (1976).
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substance of section 28.186 Therefore, Penal Code section 25 has only
a minimal effect on the diminished capacity defense.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Although the statutory reforms outlined in this comment have gone
a long way toward restricting the use of the diminised capacity defense,
several areas of the reforms need refinement. The legislature for ex-
ample, should seek to make the restrictions on mental health evidence
in the guilt phase more readily understandable by eliminating the con-
fusing dichotomy of Penal Code section 28 subdivision (a). This could
be accomplished by simply stating that only mental health evidence
which is probative of whether a defendant actually formed the re-
quisite mens rea is admissible in the guilt phase. Penal Code section
28 should also be amended to specifically state that the intent of sub-
division (a) is to return to the strictest mens rea approach that is
constitutionally permissible. In addition to the foregoing the legislature
should clarify the definition of the term "diminished capacity" as
used in subdivision (b) of section 28. Finally, the courts should per-
mit a special jury instruction any time mental health evidence is in-
troduced at the guilt phase of trial. This jury instruction should be
written in a manner that specifically apprises the jury of its duty only
to use the mental health evidence for determining whether the defen-
dant actually formed the requisite intent, and not as a mitigating fac-
tor in determining responsibility.
CONCLUSION
An examination of the changes that the diminished capacity defense
has undergone in its thirty year history has shown a dramatic expan-
sion in approach. The defense has shifted from a very narrow strict
mens rea approach to a greater focus on mental health evidence as
it related to a defendant's moral turpitude and volitional capabilities.
The California Legislature, concerned about the effect of the judicial
expansion of diminished capacity, enacted measures to shift the em-
phasis of the defense back toward the strict mens rea approach, which
focuses only on whether the defendant actually formed the required
mens rea of the crime charged. Unfortunately, the ambiguous and
inconsistent language of Penal Code sections 25 and 28 has created
confusion about the scope of admissible mental health evidence and
186. See Guide, supra note 179, at 8-2.
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uncertainty regarding the state of diminished capacity as a defense
in California. Through the use of extraneous sources, this author has
analyzed legislative history of Senate Bill 54 and the amendments ef-
fected by Senate Bill 54 to discover the general purpose of the bill.
With the probable intent of the legislature in mind, this author inter-
preted Penal code section 25 and 28 clarifying the ambiguities and
resolving the apparent inconsistancies. Interpreted in the manner sug-
gested by this comment, these Penal Code provisions restrict mental
health evidence in the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial to the strict
mens rea approach. Thus, this comment also demonstrated that the
diminished capacity defense is still available to defendants in Califor-
nia who can show that because of mental illness, they did not form
the required mens rea of the crime charged.
Kevin Seibert
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